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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the frequency, determinants and 
implications of misreporting fundraising activities. We compare state telemarketing 
campaign reports with the associated information from nonprofits’ annual Form 990 
filings to directly test nonprofits’ revenue and expense recognition policies. Our study 
indicates that smaller nonprofits, and those with less accounting sophistication, are more 
likely to inappropriately report telemarketing costs as a component of net revenues rather 
than as expenses. In addition, less monitored firms are more likely to report telemarketing 
campaign revenues net of expenses. Additionally, among those firms that do report 
telemarketing costs as expenses, we find that smaller firms, and those with relatively less 
officer compensation, are more likely to allocate telemarketing expenses to non-
fundraising expense categories. 
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Data Availability: All data are from public sources.
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MISREPORTING FUNDRAISING: HOW DO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
ACCOUNT FOR TELEMARKETING CAMPAIGNS? 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fundraising campaigns that reach a large number of potential donors can be time-
consuming and complex. For this reason, nonprofit organizations often hire professional 
solicitation firms that have access to mailing or telephone lists and a larger fundraising 
staff than the nonprofit can employ. One concern about this method of fundraising is that 
it can be expensive, with the professional solicitor retaining all or most of the proceeds 
collected on a nonprofit’s behalf (Keating et al. 2003; Strom 2003; and Bartosiewicz 
2004). In an attempt to increase monitoring of this fundraising technique and improve 
external governance of nonprofits, several state regulators issue annual reports to make 
potential donors aware of these high costs. The New York State “Pennies for Charity” 
report, for example, reveals that professional solicitors in that state retained $0.73 of 
every dollar raised through telemarketing campaigns between 1994 and 2001 (Keating et 
al. 2003). A second concern is that the public is being misled about the true costs of 
fundraising on nonprofits’ annual financial filings with the IRS (Urban Institute 2004, 
Krishnan et al. 2006). The possibility exists that nonprofits may intentionally hide the 
costs associated with this often expensive fundraising technique in order to improve 
financial reports and fool donors about organizational performance. 
Our paper examines nonprofits that hire professional solicitors to conduct 
telemarketing campaigns to determine under what conditions they appropriately report 
the associated expenses. Using annual IRS filings (Form 990s) and matching them to 
state reports of individual telemarketing campaigns, we test for two potential forms of 
 
misreporting costs. First, we investigate whether nonprofits report the proceeds, net of the 
associated fundraising expense, as contribution revenue. This accounting method violates 
current accounting standards (both SFAS No. 117 and IRS 990 reporting rules) which 
require that all gross revenue and related expense amounts be separately reported. 
Second, for the firms that report telemarketing costs, we explore whether the 
telemarketing costs are fully reported as fundraising expenses rather than allocated to the 
program or administrative categories.  
 The reliability of nonprofit financial reports is important. Prior research 
documents that donors and grantors use financial information to inform contribution 
decisions (e.g., Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986; Tinkelman 1999; Greenlee and Brown 
1999, and Parsons 2003) and that boards rely on this information to make executive 
compensation decisions (Baber et al. 2002). Further, watchdog groups issue ratings based 
largely on Form 990 financial information. These ratings depend heavily on efficiency 
ratios – such as the ratio of program expense to total expense and the ratio of fundraising 
expense to total contributions – to evaluate spending efficiency.1  
There is evidence that some nonprofits misreport, or even intentionally manage, 
financial information to impact how program or fundraising costs are reported. An Urban 
Institute study (2004) indicates that only 41.6 percent of the nonprofits that receive 
contributions report fundraising expenses. Trussel (2003) finds that certain performance 
indicators, such as lower surplus margins or less deferred revenue, are positively related 
to the likelihood that a nonprofit will manipulate its program efficiency ratio. Jones and 
Roberts (2006) suggest that nonprofits use joint cost allocations to avoid reporting 
changes in the program ratio. Krishnan et al. (2006) show that some nonprofits 
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inappropriately report zero fundraising expenses despite evidence on the internet that 
they engage in activities that can arguably be considered fundraising. Their paper further 
finds that nonprofits are more likely to report zero fundraising costs when donations or 
managers’ pay are sensitive to changes in reported program ratios (or changes in 
revenue).  
Our study extends this research and provides further evidence that many 
nonprofits underreport fundraising costs. Additionally, this paper is the first to 
specifically consider the impact of accounting sophistication on nonprofit reporting 
practices.2 Our results, however, indicate misreporting of fundraising costs is at least 
partly due to lack of accounting sophistication and not necessarily due to an intent to 
mislead financial statement readers. These results can inform the current debates by states 
and federal regulators as they search for ways to improve the quality of nonprofit 
financial reports. We examine a group of nonprofits that undeniably engage in 
fundraising activities (i.e., telemarketing) and study whether these organizations comply 
with clear rules for reporting this type of activity. Using a conservative estimate of a 
nonprofit’s telemarketing activity, we determine that 16 percent of our larger sample of 
telemarketing firm-years report no fundraising expenses. An additional 20 percent appear 
to underreport fundraising costs.  
We investigate the factors associated with misreporting to determine whether 
nonprofit managers deliberately understate their fundraising expenses. We find that 
smaller nonprofits and those with less accounting sophistication are more likely to 
inappropriately report their telemarketing costs in net revenues. In addition, less 
monitored firms (those that are unaudited or have lower leverage) are more likely to 
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report telemarketing campaign revenues net of expenses. Even though this decision 
dramatically alters key financial ratios, we interpret these findings as evidence of a lack 
of accounting sophistication rather than an intent to mislead financial statement readers.  
 Among those firms that do report telemarketing costs as expenses, we find that 
smaller firms, those with relatively less officer compensation, and nonprofits with lower 
leverage are more likely to allocate telemarketing expenses to non-fundraising expense 
categories. This finding provides evidence that allocation may occur without a proper 
understanding of the allocation rules. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes 
professional fundraising campaigns and the related accounting issues. Section three 
presents the research hypotheses and the methodology. Section four describes the data. 
The results are summarized in section five. Section six concludes with a summary of the 
study’s contributions. 
 
II. PROFESSIONAL FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGNS 
The Cost of Telemarketing Campaigns 
Though many nonprofits hire professional telemarketing firms to organize and 
complete their fundraising efforts, the use of telemarketing firms is controversial among 
charity officials, regulators, watchdog agencies, and donors. As a result, 39 states require 
nonprofit organizations that engage in charitable solicitations to register with the state. 
Twenty-two of these states require professional fundraisers to file reports regarding their 
telemarketing activities, and ten make telemarketer reports available to donors via the 
state’s website. 
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Despite a number of arguments justifying the high costs of professional 
campaigns (Suhrke 2002), regulators are concerned that donors are neither fully aware of 
nor correctly informed about the cost of telemarketing campaigns, particularly at the time 
of solicitation. The State of Illinois pursued one case to the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.), asserting that the telemarketer led donors to 
believe a significant percentage of the funds would directly benefit Vietnam veterans, 
when in fact 85 percent of the funds went to the telemarketer or to cover the nonprofit’s 
administrative costs. The Supreme Court found, in this case, that there had been 
“particular representations made with intent to mislead” by the telemarketing firm. 
However, the Court refused to define high fundraising costs as fraudulent. 
The Potential to Misreport Telemarketing Costs 
Our study focuses on a less transparent issue: the representations that nonprofits 
make about telemarketing campaigns on their Form 990. IRS reporting rules specify that 
nonprofits that use professional fundraisers must report the gross proceeds from these 
campaigns as contributions revenue and separately report the fees retained by the 
professional fundraisers as fundraising expense. In fact, nonprofit organizations are to 
report the costs incurred from fundraising conducted by third-party fundraisers in the 
Form 990 statement of functional expenses on a separate line designated as “professional 
fundraising fees.”  
A nonprofit can conceal the costs of these campaigns in two ways. First, 
nonprofits can report the net proceeds collected as contributions revenue rather than 
showing gross revenue as contributions and the telemarketers’ fees separately as 
fundraising expense. Such reporting does not impact earnings, but it does affect the 
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reported program and fundraising efficiency ratios that donors and others use for 
decision-making.  
As an example, assume that prior to recording activities related to a telemarketing 
campaign, a nonprofit collects $100,000. From these revenues, the organization spends 
$60,000 on programs, $10,000 on general administration costs, and $20,000 on 
fundraising. The remaining $10,000 is saved for future years. During the year the 
organization engages a professional fundraising firm to conduct a telemarketing 
campaign on its behalf. The professional fundraiser collects $25,000, retains $18,750 (75 
percent) of the proceeds as a fundraising fee, and remits the remaining $6,250 to the 
nonprofit organization. The nonprofit uses the entire amount received from the 
professional solicitor on its programs. If the nonprofit includes only the net proceeds 
from the telemarketing campaign as contributions revenue, it reports a program 
(fundraising) efficiency ratio of 69 (19) percent.3 If it follows current accounting 
standards and IRS reporting rules and reports the gross proceeds as revenue and the 
retained fee as fundraising expense, it reports less impressive program and fundraising 
ratios of 58 and 31 percent, respectively.4  
A second technique that conceals telemarketing costs involves properly reporting 
gross revenues collected by the professional fundraiser, but then allocating some 
telemarketing costs to program activities. Using the previous example, if the entire 
$18,750 telemarketing fee is reported as fundraising expense, it generates a program ratio 
of 58 percent. If management decides to allocate 50 percent of the telemarketing fee to 
program costs, then the reported program ratio increases to 66 percent, while the 
fundraising ratio is decreased from 31 percent to a more attractive 24 percent.5  
 6
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN 
Categorizing Reporting Practices 
Using the misreporting techniques described above, we classify a nonprofit’s 
accounting practices in two ways: (1) as a gross or net revenue reporter and (2) as a 
fundraising cost allocator or nonallocator. To be classified as a gross revenue reporter, a 
nonprofit must report contributions on the Form 990 that equal or exceed our estimate of 
gross telemarketing receipts and also report some fundraising expenses. This approach, 
however, may inappropriately classify firms with other sources of contribution revenue as 
gross revenue reporters, thereby biasing against finding that nonprofits misreport 
revenues. 
We then categorize nonprofits by whether they allocate telemarketing fees to non-
fundraising activities. We define net reporters as those that report telemarketing fees as 
contra-revenues rather than expenses, thus excluding these organizations from the second 
test. Using the remaining population, we compare our estimate of telemarketing fees to 
total fundraising expenses on the Form 990. Nonprofits that reflect telemarketing costs as 
fundraising expense should report total fundraising expense on the Form 990 that is 
higher than the combined fees paid to all solicitors.6
 Allocation, however, is not necessarily a form of misreporting. The AICPA’s SOP 
87-2 and 98-2 allow the allocation of fundraising costs when fundraising activities are 
incurred jointly with programmatic activities (see Roberts 2005 for complete discussion 
of the joint cost rules). This standard is applied under limited circumstances and is 
typically used to decide whether and how to allocate costs related to direct-mailing 
fundraising activities. In fact, only 23 percent of our sample indicates that they use the 
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joint cost standards. However, we are concerned that managers who allocate a portion of 
telemarketing fees out of fundraising expense may do so without proper regard for the 
rules.  
 In summary, the first test examines management’s decision to report gross 
revenue and the related telemarketing expense. The second test focuses on the nonprofits 
that properly report gross revenues and examines how these nonprofits report the 
telemarketing fees associated with these revenues.  
Hypotheses and Regression Models 
State reports of the activities of professional fundraisers aim to inform donors 
about fundraising costs and address the concern that donors are misled by reported 
efficiency ratios. However, professional telemarketers report the results of individual 
telemarketing campaigns while nonprofits are responsible for their Form 990 filings. 
There is no mechanism to ensure the information reported on these two documents is 
consistent. Similar to Greenlee and Gordon (1998), we use actual fundraising costs 
reported in state telemarketing reports to investigate the veracity of fundraising costs 
reported by nonprofits.7
We hypothesize that the pressure to report favorable efficiency ratios affects most 
nonprofits, but that circumstances such as financial distress may impact the motivation to 
misreport the fundraising costs associated with telemarketing campaigns. We also expect 
that certain forms of nonprofit accountability and governance, such as professionally 
staffed organizations or external monitoring, mitigate the likelihood of inappropriate 
financial reporting.  
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To determine if the occurrence of net reporting or allocation of the costs related to 
professional fundraising campaigns is systematically determined by, accounting 
sophistication, governance measures designed to protect against misreporting, or 
incentives to misreport, we use the following logistic regression models: 
P(Net Reporting) = β0 + β1lnASSETS + β2lnOFFSAL + β3ACCRUAL + 
β4PROFACCT + β5RESTRICTED + β6501c3 + β7AUDIT + 
β8LEVERAGE + β9YIELD +β10SECTOR + ε 
 
(1) 
 
We first calculate REVDIFF = Contributions on Form 990 – Telemarketing Gross 
Receipts. Net Reporting is one if either (a) REVDIFF < 0 or (b) fundraising expenses 
reported on the 990 = 0, and zero otherwise. 
P(Allocator) = λ0 + λ1lnASSETS + λ2lnOFFSAL + λ3ACCRUAL + 
λ4PROFACCT + λ5RESTRICTED + λ6501c3 + λ7AUDIT + 
λ8LEVERAGE + λ9YIELD+ λ10SECTOR + ε 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
We calculate COSTDIFF = Fundraising Expense on Form 990 – Telemarketing Fees. 
Allocator is one if COSTDIFF < 0, and zero otherwise, using a sample that is composed 
only of firms identified as gross reporters. 
The independent variables are defined below. 
Professionalism and Accounting Sophistication 
According to Tinkelman (1999), larger organizations are more likely to have 
quality financial reports because they are more likely to have professional accounting 
expertise. Following Tinkelman, we use the natural logarithm of beginning total assets 
(lnASSETS) as a proxy for organizational size. We predict negative coefficients for 
lnASSETS.8
In addition to organizational size, we use the natural logarithm of officers’ 
salaries and wages (lnOFFSAL) from Part II, line 25 of Form 990 to measure the degree 
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to which an organization has professional managers. Tinkelman (1999) proposes that the 
existence of professional (versus voluntary) management may indicate a higher level of 
accounting sophistication and a greater ability to produce high-quality financial reports. 
Baber et al. (2002), however, find that changes in executive compensation are positively 
associated with changes in program ratios. Managers may have an incentive to conceal 
fundraising costs to improve efficiency ratios and increase compensation. Thus, we do 
not predict the sign on the coefficients for lnOFFSAL. 
We include two measures that reflect management’s knowledge of generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Although the IRS does not require nonprofits to 
use GAAP when completing Form 990, knowledge and use of GAAP indicate accounting 
sophistication. The first measure, ACCRUAL, is one if an organization uses accrual 
accounting, and zero otherwise. We predict the coefficients on ACCRUAL are < 0.  
An organization that engages an external professional accountant to assist with its 
reporting function is more likely to use proper accounting in its Form 990. Similar to 
Krishnan et al. (2006), we use an indicator variable (PROFACCT) that is one if 
accounting fees on Part II, line 31 of Form 990 are > 0, and zero otherwise. We predict 
negative coefficients on PROFACCT. 
 Donors may impose restrictions on the use of their charitable contributions. These 
limitations can direct the use of donated funds for a specific purpose or time period, or 
can require that the donation is permanently invested in order to serve as an ongoing 
source of investment income for the nonprofit. Nonprofits that receive restricted 
donations are likely to be more complex in terms of their range of operations and also 
more sophisticated in their accounting with a wider range of services offered than 
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nonprofits with no restricted contributions. We include a dummy variable, 
RESTRICTED, that is equal to one if temporarily or permanently restricted net assets are 
> 0, and zero otherwise. We expect the coefficients on RESTRICTED are negative.  
External Monitoring 
Desai and Yetman (2005) and Yetman and Yetman (2006) demonstrate that 
nonprofit organizations are less likely to misreport when they are monitored. One form of 
monitoring is the federal requirement that most nonprofits organized as non-church 
501(c)3 entities must file an annual Form 990 if they earn $25,000 or more in revenues, 
and make that informational filing available to any interested party upon request. 
Availability of financial information means these nonprofits are subjected to greater 
scrutiny by the donor public or watchdog agencies. To meet the public disclosure 
requirement, some nonprofits post their annual 990 filings on their own websites. 
Additionally, GuideStar collects the financial information from informational tax filings 
and has compiled a large searchable database that makes this information available, via 
the internet, in a single location for a variety of stakeholders (see www.guidestar.org). In 
contrast, current law does not require non-501(c)3s and private foundations to make their 
Form 990s publicly available.  
To date, most nonprofit accounting research examines only 501(c)3 organizations. 
Our study, however, includes many non-501(c)3 organizations, such as police and fire 
support organizations. We use a dummy variable, 501c3, that is one if the organization is 
a 501(c)3 organization, and zero otherwise. We predict that 501(c)3 organizations are less 
likely than non-501(c)3 organizations to misreport fundraising expenses; thus, we expect 
negative coefficients on 501c3. 
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Another important form of monitoring is an audit by an independent accountant. 
Some states require organizations that are registered in the state or doing sufficient 
business therein (usually based on total revenues) to submit audited financial statements. 
In addition to state-mandated audits, nonprofit organizations that receive a pre-defined 
level of federal funds must undergo an audit in compliance with the Office of 
Management and Budget’s Circular No. A-133. We use a dummy variable, AUDIT, that 
is one if either (a) an organization meets the audit requirements of the state in which it is 
incorporated or in which it solicits funds or (b) we find, by searching the Single Audit 
Database maintained by the Census Bureau, that the organization was subject to an A-133 
audit, and zero otherwise.9 We expect the presence of an audit (whether state- or 
federally-mandated) to be negatively associated with the occurrence of net reporting or 
allocating fundraising costs. 
Financial Indicators 
Organizations with poor financial health have greater incentive to use accounting 
techniques that improve their financial reports. Thus, organizations experiencing 
financial distress or unfavorable results may be more likely to use net reporting or 
allocate fundraising costs than those that are more financially robust or efficient. 
Consistent with prior research (Krishnan et al. 2006) we include leverage to measure the 
financial health of nonprofit organizations. We compute LEVERAGE as beginning total 
liabilities divided by beginning total assets. Lower leverage (higher solvency) indicates a 
more financially robust organization, which may mitigate incentives for misreporting. 
However, high leverage may be associated with monitoring related to debt or unearned 
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revenue provided by creditors or donors/members, respectively, relative to firms with 
lower leverage. We do not predict a sign on the coefficients for LEVERAGE.10
The primary criticism of telemarketing is that it is too expensive, thus we predict 
that a manager’s incentive to hide the cost of professional fundraising activities is 
positively related to the relative cost of those activities. We measure the cost of 
telemarketing activities as the combined net proceeds received by the nonprofit, divided 
by the combined gross proceeds raised on the nonprofit’s behalf (YIELD). We expect 
negative coefficients on YIELD. 
Sector 
We control for nonprofit sector using the first digit of the National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes. The sectors examined separately in our analysis include 
arts, education, health, and human services. All other types of organizations are grouped 
as “other.”  
IV. DATASETS 
Telemarketing Campaign Data 
To test our hypotheses, we use data from telemarketing reports available from 
state regulators and IRS Form 990 filings. Various states require professional fundraisers 
to file annual reports detailing the nonprofits for which they have generated donations, 
the gross proceeds collected on behalf of each organization, and the net proceeds remitted 
to the nonprofits. We collect these fundraising reports from the states’ websites, usually 
from the office of the state attorney general. We retrieve state fundraising reports for 
California starting in 1995 and for New York in 1996. In subsequent years, we access 
reports from Ohio, Massachusetts, Vermont, North Carolina, Indiana, and Connecticut. 
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Our sample includes reports from both large and small states with a variety of oversight 
regulations.11  
Most reports are only available in Adobe Acrobat (“pdf”) format, so a conversion 
process is required to convert the data into a machine-readable form, often requiring 
manual data input. After minor data cleaning, combining the state reports yields data 
from eight states on 20,203 telemarketing campaigns undertaken by 635 professional 
fundraisers on behalf of 4,248 nonprofits. 
The requirements for fundraising reports vary across states. Some of the reports 
filed include only information about campaigns conducted within the state. Others 
include information about nationwide fundraising proceeds. In some cases, it appears that 
national figures are provided even though state-specific data is requested. Sometimes, 
when a campaign conducted in one year is completed in a second, the gross receipts of a 
single campaign are reported to the state in two consecutive years. The result of this 
variation of reporting practice is that a single campaign may be reported simultaneously 
to more than one state or that a single campaign may be reported to a state in multiple 
years.  
To eliminate duplicate campaigns, we compare every campaign by a given 
telemarketing firm for a given nonprofit organization. Because there is no campaign 
number or other similar identifier (such as an employer identification number), the 
comparison requires that we first standardize the names of the nonprofit organizations 
and the telemarketing firms.12 We then compare the campaigns reported for a nonprofit-
telemarketer combination. If we find multiple campaigns with equal gross receipts 
(within $10), we retain a single campaign with the highest net receipts reported in the 
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earliest year. Eliminating these duplicate campaign reports results in a reduced sample of 
16,977 unique fundraising campaigns. Table 1 summarizes our dataset (campaign-level 
sample) of telemarketing campaigns without duplicated gross receipts during the period 
1995 to 2004.  
Table 1 about here 
We recognize that the due dates for interim reports differ from state to state, thus 
our next concern is to address the possibility that interim and final reports are filed for the 
same campaigns. Several state reports do not indicate which campaign results are interim, 
so gross proceeds from one campaign may be included in both interim and final reports. 
Similarly, telemarketers may report state campaign figures to one state and national 
campaign figures to another state. To reduce the chances of double counting proceeds 
from a single campaign reported in different state reports, we retain only the largest 
telemarketing campaign completed by a given solicitor for a given nonprofit in any 
particular year in our dataset. This eliminates 3,551 campaigns, reducing our sample to 
13,426 unique telemarketing campaigns known as the firm-fundraiser-year sample (see 
Table 2).13  
Table 2 about here 
The next step is to consolidate all of the campaigns on behalf of a given nonprofit 
in a single year so that we can compare the proceeds from these campaigns to the Form 
990. To do this, we sum all the campaigns in one year for a unique nonprofit organization 
from all telemarketing firms (using only the largest campaign reported by each 
fundraiser). After we total the highest gross receipts from each telemarketing firm 
associated with a particular nonprofit-year, we have a sample size of 11,375 firm-years 
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(see Table 2). We then compare these firm-year telemarketing proceeds data to the 
financial reports filed by the nonprofit organizations.  
Form 990 Financial Statement Data 
 For the financial data filed by the nonprofit organizations, we use two sources: the 
Core files of IRS Form 990s for the years 1994-2004 and the Digitized Data file of IRS 
Form 990s for the years 1998-2003. Both data sources are distributed to academic 
researchers by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban 
Institute. 
 The Core data files provide limited information from all tax exempt organizations 
required to file a Form 990 or 990-EZ.14 The Core data is composed of two separate files 
each year for 501(c)3 and non-501(c)3 filers. Both Core files contain the same Form 990 
variables, representing the major financial accounts, but exclude some of our variables of 
interest. In contrast, the NCCS Digitized Data file contains all numbered items from the 
Form 990 and 990-EZ (though not details from required attached schedules), and thus is 
more comprehensive than the Core files. However, it only covers 501(c)3 filers and the 
later years of our sample.  
We use the two data sources to develop two initial datasets. The base dataset 
employs financial information from both sources. In the early years, this dataset uses the 
Core data, and, when possible, switches to the Digitized Data file in the later years. As 
the Digitized Data file does not include non-501(c)3 organizations, the Core data is used 
for those firms in the more recent years. The advantage of this “both sources” dataset is 
that it has the most firm-year observations, allowing us to develop the largest possible 
database – 4,871 firm-years (see Table 2). Unfortunately, the inclusion of the Core data 
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limits our ability to include some variables (ACCRUAL, PROFACCT, and 
RESTRICTED) due to missing data fields. Additionally, the Core data file includes total 
contributions, but does not separately include direct contributions (which is where 
telemarketing gross receipts should be reported) and indirect revenues. For this reason, 
we develop a second “digitized dataset” that uses only observations from the Digitized 
Data file. The extensive coding in the Digitized Data file allows the inclusion of 
numerous additional independent variables (ACCRUAL, PROFACCT, and 
RESTRICTED), as well as the more precise direct contributions measurement for 
comparison with telemarketing reports. 
Combined Data 
 A major challenge is to match the telemarketing campaign data to the Form 990 
data, since the state campaign data reports identify nonprofits by name (and not by 
numeric identifier). We employ a multiple-round procedure that involves having research 
assistants trace the nonprofit name from the campaign reports into the IRS Business 
Master File, which is a database of organizations granted federal exemption by the IRS, 
or the Guidestar database of recent Form 990s, in order to identify the associated 
employer identification number (EIN).15 After the list of potential matches is developed, 
the authors review the work and then open and read a number of Form 990s to assure that 
the name and EIN matches identify the appropriate nonprofit.16
 We are unable to find EINs for some organizations as the IRS Business Master 
File and Guidestar do not include filings for all tax-exempt organizations. An IRS study 
(1994) reveals that the Business Master File is missing a significant number of nonprofit 
organizations. In addition, if police and fire support organizations and public school 
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booster clubs are considered part of their respective municipalities and benefit from 
municipal government tax exemptions, they may opt not to file Form 990s. In other 
instances, we find too many possible matches, particularly from federated organizations 
that have multiple chapters that are independently incorporated nonprofits. If we do not 
feel confident that we have identified the correct EIN for a nonprofit name, we do not 
include the telemarketing observations for that nonprofit in our final datasets.  
 The next step is to match the data from the state fundraising reports to the datasets 
we develop using the Core and Digitized Data files. For the “both sources” dataset, we 
find financial information for 4,871 (43 percent) of the 11,375 observations in our firm-
year sample. We find an EIN but are unable to find any financial information for an 
additional 1,462 (13 percent) of the firm-years. The major reason for these missing 
observations is that all churches and other nonprofits with less than $25,000 in annual 
revenue are exempt from the annual Form 990 filing requirement (see Table 3). 
Additionally, we find 1,024 firm-year observations in which the combined campaigns 
had gross receipts of $25,000 or more in revenues but for which we find no associated 
Form 990. This indicates that the use of net revenue reporting of telemarketing 
campaigns may allow nonprofits to avoid filing Form 990s.  
Table 3 about here 
The 4,871 firm-year observations with clearly identified EINs represent 8,796 
campaigns with average net proceeds of $171,904 and a median yield of 30 percent. The 
remaining 6,504 firm-year observations that are not matched to financial data are based 
on 8,181 campaigns, which generate $90,554 on average, with a median yield of 26 
percent.  
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Due to the high percentage of telemarketing data that we cannot match to Form 
990s and the significant difference in median yield, we are concerned about the 
generalizability of our results to the broader telemarketing nonprofit population. To 
assess sample selection bias, we use the campaign sample (N=16,977) and regress the 
campaign yield (net proceeds remitted to the nonprofit divided by gross proceeds raised 
on the nonprofit’s behalf) on factors found to be relevant in Keating et al. (2003), such as 
campaign size, the solicitors’ and nonprofits’ experience in telemarketing, and purported 
charity focus. Our primary variable of interest is whether a campaign can be matched to 
financial data. We find that this coefficient is insignificant, suggesting that the campaigns 
that successfully match to the Form 990 data do not differ from the unmatched campaigns 
from a yield perspective after controlling for size, experience, and industry.   
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Using the “both sources” dataset, we have 4,871 firm-years available for analysis. 
Due to data limitations, we exclude 736 observations from Form 990EZ filers, which lack 
fundraising expense information, and an additional 61 observations with missing data. 
Due to problems of data accuracy arising from preparer errors and coding mistakes, we 
conduct outlier analysis, using the DBETA overall measure of influence, and drop 11 
observations that are overly influential in one or both of the regressions. Our final sample 
is 4,063 firm-year observations representing 1,382 nonprofit organizations. Table 4 
provides numerical derivation for the regressions based on the two different datasets. 
Table 4 about here 
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 The univariate statistics for the various samples are in Table 5. As shown in Panel 
A, gross reporters differ substantially from the net reporters. Note that during the sample 
period, 91 percent of sample organizations are always labeled gross reporters or are 
always labeled net reporters. In fact, only three percent of the organizations have more 
than one change between reporting categories. In the “both sources” dataset, 27 percent 
of the firm-years in the sample are classified as net reporters. These observations 
represent substantially smaller firms and have median beginning total assets of $255,000 
as compared to approximately $3.5 million for gross reporter observations. Similarly, 
total officers’ salaries for observations classified as net reporters are substantially lower. 
Net reporters have a summary campaign yield averaging 34 percent versus 36 percent for 
the gross reporters. They are much less likely to be 501(c)3 organizations (56 percent 
versus 92 percent) or to be audited (71 percent compared to 97 percent for gross 
reporters). There is not a significant difference between the leverage reported by gross 
and net reporters. Human service organizations represent 23 percent of the observations, 
yet are 26 percent of the net reporter firm-years and 35 percent of the allocator firm-
years. Arts and educational organizations are 20 percent of the overall sample but only 
nine percent of the net reporter subsample and eight percent of the allocators. Forty 
percent of the observations in the “both sources” sample are classified as “other.” These 
firms, which are primarily non-501(c)3 and societal benefit organizations, represent 51 
percent of the net reporter firm-years but only 33 percent of the allocator firm-years.  
 In the “digitized dataset,” the comparison of gross and net reporters on the 
common variables is qualitatively similar to the results from the “both sources” dataset. 
Only 52 percent of the net reporters use accrual accounting compared to 92 percent for 
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gross reporters. Unexpectedly, net and gross reporters do not differ significantly in their 
reliance on external accountants with 72 percent usage by net reporters and 71 percent by 
gross reporters. However, net reporters are much less likely to report either permanently 
or temporarily restricted net assets with only 25 percent noting restricted net assets versus 
75 percent for gross reporters. Overall, 28 percent of the observations from the “digitized 
dataset” are of human service providers, 13 percent are associated with educational 
institutions, 15 percent are from the arts, and 24 percent are not classified. Human service 
providers, however, represent 45 percent of the net reporters and 42 percent of the 
allocators, respectively. Arts organizations tend to be nonallocating gross reporters and 
represent only six percent of the net reporters and three percent of the allocators.  
Table 5 about here 
Table 5, Panel B summarizes the univariate statistics for gross reporters that 
allocate fundraising expenses and those that do not. Of the 2,954 firm-years in this “both 
sources” sample (representing 980 nonprofits), 359 firm-years (12 percent) appear to 
allocate a portion of their telemarketing fees to non-fundraising categories. The allocators 
are significantly different from nonallocators on most attributes other than 501(c)3 status. 
Allocators are smaller (median beginning total assets of $394,000) compared to 
nonallocators (median total assets of approximately $466,000), have smaller campaign 
yields (33 percent versus 37 percent), and are less likely to be audited (94 percent 
compared to 97 percent).  
In the more detailed “digitized dataset” the allocators exhibit significantly 
different attributes from nonallocators. Allocators less frequently use accrual accounting 
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(79 percent to 93 percent) and report restricted net assets (40 percent compared to 79 
percent).  
Regression Results 
The correlations among the independent variables are presented in Table 6. For 
the “both sources” full sample, the independent variables with the highest degrees of 
correlation are lnASSETS with lnOFFSAL and 501c3, with correlations of 0.42 and 0.33, 
respectively. For the more limited sample used in the second regression, the correlations 
are much lower with the highest correlation being 0.35 between lnASSETS and 
lnOFFSAL. 
In the “digitized dataset,” several variables have relatively high correlations, 
making it less likely that these variables will be significant in regression. The 
RESTRICTED, ACCRUAL, lnASSETS, lnOFFSAL and AUDIT are all correlated with 
each other in the 0.39 to 0.67 range. The correlations are lower in the more limited 
sample used in the second regression with most of the correlations of the five variables in 
the 0.15 to 0.44 range. The correlation of RESTRICTED to lnASSETS, however, is 0.60.  
Table 6 about here 
The first model reported in Tables 7 and 8 provides the results for regressions that 
use Core and Digitized data in the “both sources” dataset; the second model in each table 
reports the regression results for the “digitized dataset” only. Recall that we use both 
these datasets because some of the variables of interest are not included in the Core data 
files. However, the “digitized dataset” does not include non-501(c)3 nonprofits or 1995-
1997 Form 990 returns. We focus the analysis first on the larger sample from the “both 
sources” dataset before turning to the additional insights that can be gleaned from the 
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richer data fields available in the more limited sample from the “digitized dataset.” To 
better understand the effects of each variable, we focus the discussion on the marginal 
effects rather than the coefficients. 
Table 7 about here 
Table 7 reports the results of logistic regression based on equation 1, which 
examines the likelihood of a nonprofit reporting only the net proceeds received from a 
professional fundraiser as revenue rather than properly reporting the gross proceeds 
collected. When organizations report on a net basis, they presumably do not report the 
expense associated with the telemarketing campaign, thus understating reported 
fundraising expenses. A positive/(negative) coefficient in this regression indicates that 
the organization is more/(less) likely to misreport telemarketing activities by reporting 
only contributions received from the professional fundraiser (i.e., net proceeds).  
We start by examining the larger “both sources” sample using the more limited 
variables available in that dataset. The pseudo R2 for this model is 29 percent. The 
estimates on lnASSETS and lnOFFSAL, which examine the effects of size and 
professional management, are both negative and statistically significant. This indicates 
larger organizations and organizations that pay more in total executive salaries are less 
likely to misreport telemarketing activities. A one-unit increase in the natural log of size 
or officer salaries translates into a 4.2 and 1.1 percentage point decrease, respectively, in 
the probability of misreporting revenues when other independent variables are held fixed 
at their means.  
Similarly, the governance variables are associated with a reduced likelihood of 
revenue misreporting. Organizations registered as 501(c)3 entities are associated with a 
 23
33.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of proper revenue reporting compared 
with non-501(c)3 entities. Being audited by a CPA firm increases the chances of properly 
reporting telemarketing proceeds by 34.2 percentage points. 
The financial health indicator, however, explains relatively little of the variance in 
the revenue reporting decision. Highly leveraged organizations are less likely to 
misreport their telemarketing revenues net of expenses. The coefficient on LEVERAGE 
is negative and statistically significant, and a one-unit change would alter the probability 
of net reporting by 1.0 percentage point. This may indicate that organizations with more 
debt are monitored by their creditors. The coefficient on the YIELD variable is 
insignificant, suggesting that nonprofits with lower telemarketing yields are not any more 
likely to misreport than their counterparts.  
The “digitized dataset” allows a broader range of variables to be tested but is 
limited to 501(c)3 organizations. The logistic regression model has a pseudo R2 of 31 
percent. The coefficients of the common variables (lnASSETS, lnOFFSAL, AUDIT, 
LEVERAGE and YIELD) are qualitatively similar. The marginal effect of a unit change 
decrease in lnASSETS and AUDIT are more modest at 1.4 and 28.3 percentage points, 
respectively, in the “digitized dataset” as compared to the “both sources” dataset. The 
statistical significance of the LEVERAGE variable is marginal in the “digitized 
dataset.”17  
Two of the measures of accounting sophistication, ACCRUAL and 
RESTRICTED, are significant in the predicted direction. Using accrual accounting 
increases the probability of properly reporting revenues by 8.7 percentage points. 
Nonprofits with some restricted net assets are 15.1 percentage points more likely to 
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properly report revenues from telemarketing campaigns. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that organizations that misreport revenues and expenses associated with 
telemarketing campaigns are more likely to do so because they lack professional 
management and accounting sophistication than from a motivation to hide poor 
organizational or telemarketing campaign performance.  
Counter to our expectations, and contrary to the findings reporting by Krishnan, et 
al. (2006), the PROFACCT variable is insignificant. Krishnan, et al. (2006) suggest that 
PROFACCT may proxy for either the use of an outside accountant to assist with 
preparing Form 990s or the use of an independent auditor. We specifically control for the 
use of an independent auditor, and include non-501(c)3 organizations, which may explain 
the difference in our result.  
Table 8 about here 
In the second test, the characteristics associated with the telemarketing cost 
allocation decision are assessed. The samples are limited to the nonprofits designated as 
gross reporters. Table 8 reports the results from estimating the logistic regression in 
equation 2. The pseudo R2 for the allocation decision is 13 percent using the “both 
sources” dataset and 19 percent for the “digitized dataset” sample. Both management 
sophistication variables, lnASSETS and lnOFFSAL, are negative and statistically 
significant, meaning that larger nonprofits and those with larger or better compensated 
professional staffs are less likely to report a portion of the telemarketing fees as non-
fundraising expenses. For the “both sources” regression, a one-unit change in lnASSETS 
and lnOFFSAL alters the probability of allocating costs by 1.8 and 0.6 percentage points, 
respectively. A potential explanation for this result is that nonprofits that are relatively 
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smaller in size or in terms of their officers’ payroll manage telemarketing costs to report 
more favorable fundraising (or program) ratios.  
 Governance and accounting sophistication variables perform quite differently in 
the allocation and revenue recognition decisions. In the “both sources” dataset, the 
501(c)3 organization variable is marginally significant in the predicted direction, but it 
reduces the likelihood of allocation of telemarketing costs by only 3.4 percentage points 
as compared to a 33.8 percentage point effect in the gross revenue test. The audit variable 
is insignificant in both allocation regressions, whereas it has a substantial mitigating 
effect in the net reporting regression. This finding is not surprising given that virtually all 
firm-years in the second test are audited. Similarly, we find that the accrual variable is 
insignificant in the “digitized dataset.” The firms that spend on outside accounting or 
auditing services do not display significantly different allocation behavior from their 
counterparts that do not use outside services. However, it should be noted that we find 
that firms that have restricted funds are less likely to allocate some telemarketing costs to 
non-fundraising activities, but the statistical significance is marginal. Overall, the results 
suggest that accounting sophistication and certain monitoring activities have a substantial 
impact on the likelihood that telemarketing expenses will be allocated to expense 
categories other than fundraising expense. 
Additional Tests 
 We conduct supplemental tests to examine the robustness of our results. First, we 
recognize that the telemarketing proceeds may be drawn from a state report whose fiscal 
year does not overlap precisely with the Form 990 fiscal year. For example, a yearly state 
report may cover a calendar year while a nonprofit has a different fiscal year. Moreover, 
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a fundraising campaign by a telemarketer may start on July 1 and end on June 30 of the 
following year. For nonprofits with a calendar fiscal year, revenues generated by 
telemarketing firms would be reported in two separate Form 990 filings. Additionally, if 
a campaign is conducted across multiple years, the partial results of the first year of the 
campaign may be reported to the state in one year, with the entire campaign (gross 
receipts from years one and two) reported to the state in the subsequent years. There may 
also be numerical variation due to differences in the cash and accrual methods used 
(especially if a campaign generates pledges receivable in one year that is collected in a 
subsequent year). 
 To decrease the likelihood that we improperly label a nonprofit organization as 
misreporting due to the mismatch between the campaign and fiscal years, we create two 
additional datasets. We sum the Form 990 data for a three-year period, including the year 
of the campaign and the years immediately before and after. For a nonprofit to be labeled 
as a net reporter or an allocator, it would then need to have three-year Form 990 numbers 
that are smaller than a single year of campaign data. Combined three-year datasets are 
constructed using financial information from both the Core and Digitized Data files 
(“both sources three year”) and from only the Digitized Data file in later years (“digitized 
data three year”). We use these more conservative datasets to test the robustness of the 
regression results obtained using our first two datasets. 
 The results from regressions that use the “both sources three-year” dataset to 
examine net reporters are largely the same as those obtained from the single year “both 
sources” dataset and have a pseudo R2 of 27 percent. The only difference is that 
LEVERAGE is not a significant predictor of either net reporting or the likelihood of 
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allocating telemarketing expense out of fundraising expense. With the “digitized data 
three-year” dataset, we find largely similar results; however, lnASSETS and 
LEVERAGE are insignificant. The variables appear to be insignificant in the regression 
due to a low correlation with the dependent variable rather than a high degree of 
multicollinearity with other independent variables. 
 The three-year datasets also generate results for the allocator test that are 
qualitatively similar to the single year datasets. For the “both sources three year” dataset, 
the 501(c)3 variable is dropped from the regression because it is so highly correlated with 
the allocation decision. However, the other variables remain significant as in the single 
year regression. With the “digitized dataset three year,” the results are essentially the 
same with one notable exception: PROFACCT is significant, while ACCRUAL is not.  
 A potential explanation for the shift is the high degree of multicollinearity 
between ACCRUAL, PROFACCT, AUDIT, and RESTRICTED. We ran a series of 
revenue recognition and allocator regressions employing combinations of these variables. 
PROFACCT is consistently insignificant using the single year “digitized dataset,” 
suggesting that our result may differ from Krishnan, et al. (2006) due to sample 
differences.18 Therefore, we conclude that the insignificance of PROFACCT is not due to 
a lack of power and high multicollinearity.  
 Liquidity and operating margin are other measures of nonprofit financial distress 
(Tuckman and Chang 1991).19 Neither of these additional financial distress variables is a 
significant predictor of misreporting and the inclusion of the variables does not 
substantially change the results of the regression analyses. 
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 We include dummy variables for each year during the sample period. Our results 
do not change when these year variables are included in the regression. Additionally, we 
run separate regressions for each year in the sample period. Although, we find the 
incidence of misreporting decreases during the sample period, our initial results are 
robust across years.  
 Yetman and Yetman (2006) indicate that states may vary in the degree to which 
they regulate nonprofits. Therefore we include dummy variables for each state in our 
sample. Our results do not change when these variables are included in the analysis. 
Finally, rules governing the allocation of joint costs changed in 1998 with the 
issuance of SOP 98-2. To determine whether the likelihood of allocating telemarketing 
expense out of fundraising expense differs as a result of SOP 98-2, we include a dummy 
variable, SOP98-2, in the regression (using “both sources”) that is one if the Form 990 is 
dated after 1998, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on this variable is not significant 
and its inclusion does not impact the regression results. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Prior research has supported a concern by regulators and donors that nonprofits 
have incentives to understate fundraising costs and may inappropriately allocate these 
costs to other activities. Our results can inform the current debates by state and federal 
regulators as they search for ways to improve the quality of nonprofit financial reports. 
Our study provides empirical evidence of how frequently misreporting of a highly 
criticized and relatively expensive fundraising method occurs, and explains the 
determinants of misreporting. This study directly tests the veracity of nonprofits’ 
 29
reporting practices by comparing federally mandated nonprofit financial reports to 
disclosures of revenues and costs of telemarketing campaigns filed by telemarketing 
solicitors in certain states. Additionally, it is the first paper to specifically consider the 
impact of accounting sophistication on nonprofit reporting practices. 
We design our tests to produce conservative estimates of telemarketing revenue 
and expense by using only the single largest reported telemarketing campaigns conducted 
each year for a nonprofit by each of its telemarketing solicitors. These estimates of total 
annual telemarketing revenues and expenses are then compared to the nonprofit’s annual 
IRS informational filing. Because we are careful to avoid incorrectly labeling a nonprofit 
a misreporter, we may not have detected net reporting by organizations with 
contributions from sources other than professional solicitors. This is particularly a 
concern for the large organizations in our sample because large nonprofits are more likely 
to generate contributions from multiple sources. Thus, we may have underestimated the 
degree to which misreporting occurs. 
With our conservative tests, we find that 27 percent of firm-years appear to 
contain misreported revenues and an additional nine percent appear to fail to fully report 
all telemarketing costs as fundraising expenses. Since the time period associated with a 
reported campaign is imprecise, we also compare the campaign revenue and expenses to 
the sum of three years of firm-wide contributions and fundraising expenses. Our tests 
suggest that at least 14 percent of this sample is misreporting revenues and at least 
another four percent is allocating telemarketing costs to an expense category other than 
fundraising. 
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Of the misreporting we detect, most occurs among small nonprofits that have 
limited accounting sophistication. Our findings suggest that nonprofits that have greater 
accounting sophistication and those likely to be subjected to greater external monitoring 
are less likely to misreport. We find that the factors associated with the more prevalent 
activity of misreporting revenue differ from those related to expense allocation. Higher 
accounting sophistication and more external monitoring appear to play a greater role in 
moderating revenue misreporting, while size and accounting sophistication are associated 
with better reporting of both forms. We interpret these results as suggesting that a lack of 
familiarity with accounting dominates misreporting decisions instead of incentives to 
improve reported results.  
Given the apparent lack of sophistication of non-501(c)3 firms, the IRS may want 
to consider extending the public Form 990 disclosure requirements to these nonprofits. 
Another policy issue relates to audits. In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
additional nonprofit scandals, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings and is 
considering additional regulation of nonprofit organizations. Numerous states have 
considered or passed legislation increasing the number of nonprofits required to have 
annual CPA audits. Our analyses suggest that audited nonprofits are much more likely to 
be better reporters, choosing to report revenues gross and less likely to allocate 
fundraising costs to programs or administrative costs. State regulations trigger audits 
once an organization reaches a certain size threshold, typically based on total revenues. 
Perhaps a much lower threshold triggered by gross telemarketing proceeds or gross 
proceeds from all externally conducted fundraising campaigns is more appropriate. 
Alternatively, a review or limited assurance procedures could be considered. 
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Table 1 – Telemarketing Campaigns by Year 
 
Year State Reports Included Number of Campaigns 
Number of 
Nonprofits 
Number of 
Telemarketers 
Average 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Average to 
Nonprofit 
Median     
Yield 
1995 California 496 416 104 285,786 116,284    24.9 
1996 California, New York 1,199 944 190 263,673 96,920    25.0 
1997 California, New York, Ohio 1,233 964 215 288,966 117,974    25.0 
1998 
California, Massachusetts, New 
York, Ohio, Vermont 1,884 1,284 268 244,617 90,413    25.0 
1999 
California, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, New York, Ohio, 
Vermont 2,124 1,444 269 246,647 89,905    28.7*** 
2000 
California, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, New York, Ohio, 
Vermont 1,762 1,175 264 353,197 168,199    25.5*** 
2001 
California, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, New York, Ohio, 
Vermont 2,134 1,434 294 332,575 162,957    30.0*** 
2002 
California, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
New York, Ohio, Vermont 2,389 1,449 319 319,076 142,278    30.0 
2003 
Connecticut, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
New York, Ohio, Vermont 2,441 1,418 261 386,876 168,107    30.5 
2004 
Indiana, North Carolina, New 
York, Vermont 1,315 846 176 317,596 135,275    35.0*** 
All Campaigns 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
New York, Ohio, Vermont 16,977 4,248 635 309,551 132,703    29.0 
Note:  Ranksum compares yield for campaigns in a given year with yield from campaigns in the previous year.   
*** Significant at the 0.01 level       
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Table 2 – Sample Selection 
 
 Level of Number of 
Number 
of 
Average 
Gross 
Average 
Proceeds 
Sample Observation Campaigns Charities Receipts To Nonprofits 
 
“Initial Sample” of Telemarketing 
Campaigns Campaign 20,203 4,248 $ 325,723 $ 140,798
“Campaign Level Sample” with Duplicate 
Campaigns Removed Across States and 
Years Campaign     16,977      4,248   $ 309,551  $ 132,703 
“Firm-Fundraiser-Year Sample” with 
Only the Largest Campaigns per Firm-
Fundraiser-Year Retained 
Firm-
Fundraiser-
Year     13,426      4,248  $ 324,983  $ 136,636 
“Firm-Year Sample” with Largest 
Campaigns Summed for Each Firm (not 
yet matched to financial data) Firm-Year     11,375      4,248   $ 383,580  $ 161,273 
“Matched Firm-Year Sample” with 
Largest Campaigns Summed for Each 
Firm Matched to Financial Data (Core 
and Digitized Data files) Firm-Year       4,871      1,625   $ 582,543  $ 253,404 
      
      
 
Table 3 – Matching EINs to Both Sources Dataset 
 
      
Number 
of Firm- 
Years 
Percentage 
of Firm-
Years 
Underlying 
Campaigns 
Percentage 
of 
Campaigns 
Average Net 
Proceeds to 
Charity 
    
All Firm-Years 11,375 100% 16,977 100% $132,703 
   
Unable to Match EIN to  
   Financial Data because: 
 
 
No Form 990 data 
available 
1,462 13% 1,870 11%  
 Multiple EINs found 480 4% 1,162 7% 
 No EIN found 4,562 40% 5,149 30%  
 Total Unmatched 6,504 57% 8,181 48% $90,554 
   
Financial Data Found 4,871 43% 8,796 52% $171,904
 
Note:  The “both sources” dataset includes financial information obtained from both the IRS 
Core files for 1994-2004 and the NCCS Digitized Data files from 1998-2003. 
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Table 4 – Sample Selection 
 
Panel A:  Dependent Variable = P (Net Reporter) 
  Both Sources  
Digitized 
Dataset  
 Total Firm-Years       4,871            2,648 
 Less: 990-EZ Filersa        (736)             (130) 
          Observations with Missing Variables          (61)               (38) 
          Outliersb           (11)               (12) 
 Final Regression Sample       4,063             2,468 
     
     
 Panel B:  Dependent Variable = P (Allocator) c    
  Both Sources  
Digitized 
Dataset  
 
Firm-Years in Panel A Final Regression 
Sample       4,063           2,468 
 Less: Net Reporters     (1,109)            (585) 
 Final Regression Sample       2,954           1,883 
     
  
 
a The 990-EZ does not report fundraising expense, which makes all EZ filers appear to be net 
reporters in the revenue test (fundraising expense appears to equal zero). Additionally 
fundraising expense is necessary for the allocator test. 
b Outliers are defined using the DBETA overall measure of influence. 
c The sample begins with firm-years that are labeled gross reporters. 
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Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A - Gross vs. Net Reporters 
  Both Sources Digitized Dataset
  Gross Net  Gross Net  
lnASSETS 14.91 12.42 *** 15.23 12.39 *** 
lnOFFSAL 8.96 4.37 *** 9.44 4.14 *** 
ACCRUAL      0.92 0.52 *** 
PROFACCT      0.71 0.72   
RESTRICTED      0.75 0.25 *** 
501c3 0.92 0.56 ***       
AUDIT 0.97 0.71 *** 0.96 0.56 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.49 0.41   0.54 0.49   
YIELD 36.22 33.72 ** 37.78 35.85   
N 2,954 1,109   1,883 585   
 
Panel B - Allocators vs. Nonallocators 
  Both Sources Digitized Dataset
  Non-Allocator Allocator  Non-Allocator Allocator  
lnASSETS 15.17 13.07 *** 15.5 12.83 *** 
lnOFFSAL 9.36 5.99 *** 9.8 6.23 *** 
ACCRUAL     0.93 0.79 *** 
PROFACCT     0.71 0.78 ** 
RESTRICTED     0.79 0.40 *** 
501c3 0.92 0.89        
AUDIT 0.97 0.94 *** 0.97 0.87 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.56 0.37 ** 0.57 0.33 ** 
YIELD 37.11 33.35 *** 38.17 34.25 * 
N 2,595 359   1,695 188   
 
 
*** Differences are significant at the 0.01 level 
** Differences are significant at the 0.05 level 
* Differences are significant at the 0.10 level  
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Table 6 – Correlations Among Independent Variables 
 
Panel A:  Independent Variables Used in Logistic Regressions with Both Sources Dataset (N = 4,063) 
 
 lnASSETS lnOFFSAL 501c3 AUDIT LEVERAGE YIELD 
lnASSETS 1.00      
lnOFFSAL 0.42 1.00     
501c3 0.33 0.27 1.00    
AUDIT 0.25 0.27 0.30 1.00   
LEVERAGE -0.14 0.02 0.02 -0.01 1.00  
YIELD 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.03 1.00 
 
 
Panel B:  Independent Variables Used in Logistic Regressions with Digitized Dataset (N = 2,954) 
 
 lnASSETS lnOFFSAL ACCRUAL PROFACCT RESTRICTED AUDIT LEVERAGE YIELD
lnASSETS 1.00        
lnOFFSAL 0.43 1.00       
ACCRUAL 0.48 0.40 1.00      
PROFACCT 0.02 0.10 0.00 1.00     
RESTRICTED 0.67 0.39 0.48 -0.04 1.00    
AUDIT 0.44 0.39 0.54 0.01 0.41 1.00   
LEVERAGE -0.15 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 1.00  
YIELD 0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.03 1.00 
 
Table 7 – Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Net Reporting Using Datasets 
 
P(Net Reporting) = β0 + β1lnASSETS + β2lnOFFSAL + β3ACCRUAL + β4PROFACCT + 
β5RESTRICTED + β6501c3 + β7AUDIT + β8LEVERAGE + + β9YIELD + β10SECTOR + ε 
 
  Both Sources  Digitized Dataset 
 Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effecta
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effecta
lnASSETS - -0.26 *** -4.2% -0.10 ** -1.4%
lnOFFSAL ? -0.07 *** -1.1% -0.08 *** -1.1%
ACCRUAL -  -0.55 ** -8.7%
PROFACCT -  -0.05  0.8%
RESTRICTED -  -0.99 *** -15.1%
501c3 - -1.65 *** -33.8%   
AUDIT - -1.61 *** -34.2% -1.49 *** -28.3%
LEVERAGE ? -0.06 *** -1.0% -0.02 * -0.3%
YIELD - 0.00  0.0% 0.00  0.0%
Constant  5.35 *** 2.51 *** 
N  4,063  2468   
Pseudo R2  29%  31%   
 
a  The marginal effect indicates the effect on the probability of net reporting of a one-unit change for continuous 
variables and a change from zero to one for discrete variables when independent variables are evaluated at their 
means. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level – two tailed test 
** Significant at the 0.05 level – two tailed test 
* Significant at the 0.10 level – two tailed test 
 
P(Net Reporting) = one if REVDIFF < 0 or if fundraising expense = 0, zero otherwise, 
lnASSETS = natural logarithm of beginning assets, 
lnOFFSAL  = natural logarithm of officers’ salaries and wages, 
ACCRUAL = one if organization uses accrual accounting and zero if it uses the cash basis, 
PROFACCT = one if accounting fees > 0, zero otherwise, 
RESTRICTED = one if permanent or temporarily restricted net assets > 0, zero otherwise, 
501c3 = one if entity is organized as a 501(c)3, zero otherwise, 
AUDIT = one if entity meets the audit requirements of a state in which it operates or 
solicits funds or is subject to an A-133 audit and zero otherwise, 
LEVERAGE = total beginning liabilities / total beginning assets, 
YIELD = combined net proceeds from telemarketing campaigns / combined gross proceeds 
from telemarketing campaigns. 
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Table 8 – Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Allocation of Fundraising Expense  
Using Datasets 
 
P(Allocator) = λ0 + λ1lnASSETS + λ2lnOFFSAL + λ3ACCRUAL + λ4PROFACCT + λ5RESTRICTED + 
λ6501c3 + λ7AUDIT + λ8LEVERAGE + λ9YIELD + λ10SECTOR + ε 
 
  Both Sources  Digitized Dataset  
 Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effecta
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effecta
lnASSETS - -0.23 *** -1.8% -0.28 *** -1.3%
lnOFFSAL ? -0.07 *** -0.6% -0.07 *** -0.3%
ACCRUAL -  0.43  1.7%
PROFACCT -  0.37  1.6%
RESTRICTED -  -0.55 * -2.8%
501c3 - 0.55 * 3.4%    
AUDIT - 0.01  0.1% -0.01  -0.1%
LEVERAGE ? -0.19 *** -1.5% -0.30 *** -1.4%
YIELD - 0.00  0.0% 0.00  0.0%
Constant  1.42 *** 2.09 *** 
N  2,954  1,883   
Pseudo R2  13%  19%   
a  The marginal effect indicates the effect on the probability of net reporting of a one-unit change for continuous 
variables and a change from zero to one for discrete variables when independent variables are evaluated at their 
means. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level – two tailed test 
** Significant at the 0.05 level – two tailed test 
* Significant at the 0.10 level – two tailed test 
 
P(Allocator) = one if COSTDIFF < 0, zero otherwise, 
lnASSETS = natural logarithm of beginning assets, 
lnOFFSAL  = natural logarithm of officers’ salaries and wages, 
ACCRUAL = one if organization uses accrual accounting, zero otherwise, 
PROFACCT = one if accounting fees > 0, zero otherwise, 
RESTRICTED = one if permanent or temporarily restricted net assets > 0, zero otherwise, 
501c3 = one if entity is organized as a 501(c)3, zero otherwise, 
AUDIT = one if entity meets the audit requirements of a state in which it operates or 
solicits funds or is subject to an A-133 audit, zero otherwise, 
LEVERAGE = total beginning liabilities / total beginning assets, 
YIELD = combined net proceeds from telemarketing campaigns / combined gross proceeds 
from telemarketing campaigns. 
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1  Donor reliance on financial information to guide fundraising decisions may have increased in recent years due to 
the creation of Guidestar, an online service that provides free access to recent Form 990 filings. 
2 Accounting sophistication could be knowledge of the accounting rules applicable to completing the Form 990 or a 
system of internal controls that mitigate the likelihood of misreporting. 
3  Program ratio with net proceeds recorded as revenues and spent on programs:  (60,000 + 6,250) / (90,000 + 6,250) 
= 69%. Fundraising ratio (fundraising expenses/total contributions) with no expense related to professional 
fundraising campaign:  20,000 / (100,000 + 6,250) = 19%. 
4  Program ratio with gross proceeds recorded as revenues, retained fee recorded as fundraising expense, and net 
proceeds spent on programs:  (60,000 + 6,250) / (90,000 + 25,000) = 58%. Fundraising ratio with retained fee 
recorded as fundraising expense:  (20,000 + 18,750) / (100,000 + 25,000) = 31%. 
5  Program ratio with 50% of retained fee allocated to program expense:  (60,000 + 6,250 + 9,375) / (90,000 + 
25,000) = 66%. Fundraising ratio with 50% of retained fee allocated to fundraising expense:  (20,000 + 9.375) / 
(100,000 + 25,000) = 24%. 
6  We choose to compare the telemarketing fees from state reports to total fundraising expense instead of 
professional fundraising fees as a review of recent Form 990s revealed that the majority of nonprofits that 
appeared to be underreporting telemarketing fees were reporting them as an “other fundraising expense” rather 
than professional fundraising fees. We do not have a good explanation for this behavior as it does not affect 
fundraising ratios. 
7  Reporting for professional telemarketing campaigns occurs annually, even if the campaigns have a duration of 
greater than one year. 
8  An alternative proxy for size is total revenues. However, we do not use total revenues to measure size as the 
number is understated if an organization reports its telemarketing revenues on a net basis. 
9  We do not have a complete list of all states in which each nonprofit telemarkets. It is possible that a nonprofit’s 
telemarketing or other activities in a particular state may require it to complete an audit, but we are unable to 
detect the need for the audit. Additionally, nonprofits can voluntarily choose to complete an audit. In these two 
cases, our AUDIT variable would be coded as zero when it should be coded as one. 
10 We do not examine financial indicators, such as program or fundraising ratios, that are impacted by misreporting 
of revenues and expenses associated with telemarketing revenues. 
11 For more information about the range of oversight options across different states, see Fremont-Smith (2005). 
12 For example, one campaign report may use the nonprofit name Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
while another refers to the same organizations as The S.P.C.A. A telemarketer may be listed at Samano, Phillip J. 
& Assoc. Inc. in one report and Phillip J. Samano and Associates, Inc. in another. 
13 The possibility exists that a nonprofit organization could have multiple campaigns by a given fundraising firm in a 
single year, so using only the largest campaign will possibly understate donations raised by professional firms. 
This may reduce the likelihood that we properly identify net reporters, and biases us against finding significant 
results in our tests. 
14 We use the IRS Core files instead of the Statistics of Income (SOI) files, because the SOI files contain primarily 
large organizations (assets greater than $10 million). Many nonprofit organizations that use professional 
fundraisers are too small to be included in the IRS SOI files. 
15 The Core and Digitized Data files identify nonprofit organizations by EIN. 
16 Selected state regulators presently require telemarketers to report the proceeds of telemarketing campaigns. 
However, there is no easy way for the public to relate this information to the applicable nonprofit as many 
nonprofit names are similar or related through a federation. The state charity office reports could encourage more 
public scrutiny if state reports included EINs and the exact name and address of each nonprofit, and ensured that 
the numbers reported were statewide rather than nationwide figures. 
17 We explore whether the negative association between LEVERAGE and net reporting is explained by bondholders 
and bankers either requiring audits or engaging in additional monitoring. In the “digitized dataset,” liabilities can 
be decomposed between bonds and other liabilities. The sample, however, has relatively few that have outstanding 
bonds, so that we are not able to effectively evaluate the role of credit relations in promoting better financial 
reporting practices. 
18  We also conducted analysis of variance influence factors, a test which can only be run on a OLS specification. It 
did not indicate any multicollinearity problems. 
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19 A number of organizations have zero liabilities which results in a current ratio that is undefined. We invert the 
current ratio to avoid losing observations. Further, we deflate profit margin by total assets rather than total 
revenue because revenue may be misreported. 
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